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LIMITING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ARISING
FROM PHYSICIAN INVESTMENT IN SPECIALTY

HOSPITALS
1. INTRODUCTION

Legislative, regulatory, and ethical standards that seek to limit conflicts of
interest exist in a variety of professional settings.' For example, executive
officers of banking corporations are prohibited from owning stock in private
banking houses or agencies that underwrite securities. 2 Public servants and
their families cannot own stock in savings and loan associations or other
financial institutions doing business with state government.3 Insurance
adjusters are prohibited from having ownership interest in fire repair
contracting firms, and life insurance agents cannot own funeral homes,
mortuaries, or cemeteries.4
Over the past century, changes in the health care market have given rise to
new ethical conflicts for physicians, sparking initiatives to limit the effect of
such conflicts. 5 Arrangements that exacerbate the worrisome tension between
the financial interests of physicians and the best interests of patients arise in a
number of contexts. 6 For example, while physician ownership in commercial
1. A conflict of interest may be defined as a condition in which an individual's professional
judgment is unduly influenced by personal gain. See Dennis F. Thompson, UnderstandingFinancial
Conflicts ofInterest, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 573, 573 (1993).
2. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 81-5-1(2) (1996 & Supp. 1999); see also 12 U.S.C. § 244
(2003) (providing that members of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors cannot hold stock in any
bank, banking institution, or trust company). Employees of the Federal Reserve and their families
also are prohibited from owning financial interests in banks or in mutual funds that concentrate on
financial services. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., Conflict of Interest Rules
for Reserve Bank Personnelwith Supervision Responsibilities, http://www.federalreserve.gov/board
docs/SRLETTERS/1 995/sr9506a2.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
3. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-4-105(4)(a) (2003).
4. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.1224(4) (West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 500.2080(1-3) (West 2002).
5. See infra Part V.
6. For example, pharmaceutical and biotechnological corporations support many, if not most,
clinical research trials. Such firms often provide significant economic incentives to physicians who
prescribe or investigate their products. The financial advantages created for physician-researchers
may create a desire to skew research methodology in order to increase patient participation or
produce favorable results. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 440 (4th ed. 1990). Other sources of incentives include: (1) monetary
kickbacks for directed referrals, (2) income earned by doctors for selling medical products or
equipment, and (3) gifts given to physicians by medical suppliers. See MARC A. RODWIN,
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ventures can provide important benefits for patient care, a conflict of interest
arises when physicians refer patients to facilities in which they have a
financial interest. 7 Critics contend that this practice, commonly called "selfreferral," 8 inappropriately affects physicians' clinical and referral behavior,
resulting in over-utilization of services. 9 Numerous studies have confirmed
the assertions of critics, demonstrating a dramatic increase in
the frequency
10
and expense of services when self-referral arrangements exist.
Consistent and costly 1 increases in utilization led the United States
Congress to enact laws restricting physician self-referral. 12 Such laws contain
a number of exceptions, including a provision that permits physician selfreferral if the physician's investment interest is in a whole hospital. 13 The
"whole hospital exception" reflects the belief among lawmakers that a
physician is unlikely to be influenced by the potential for profit when
referring to a general acute-care hospital due to three factors: size, scope, and
stake. 14 However, in drafting the exception, lawmakers did not anticipate the
evolution and proliferation of a new kind of hospital, characterized by a
relatively small size, a limited scope of services, and a greater stake in
profitability for physicians: the specialty hospital.
The recent proliferation of specialty hospitals has revived concerns
regarding physicians' conflicts of interest and potential changes in the referral
MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 56 (1993).

Physician

risk-sharing with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and hospital purchasing and bonding
practices are also areas of concern. See Thompson, supra note 1, at 573.
7. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Conflicts of
Interest: Physician Ownership of Medical Facilities,267 JAMA 2366, 2366 (1992).
8. HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 993 (Furrow et al. eds, 4th ed. 2001).
9. In addition to staggering increases in costs, the referral of patients for unnecessary diagnostic
or therapeutic procedures exposes individual patients to unnecessary risks and may adversely affect
an individual patient's health. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.053(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (noting
that, "[tihe Legislature finds these referral practices may limit or eliminate competitive alternatives in
the health care services market, may result in overutilization of health care services, may increase
costs to the health care system, and may adversely affect the quality of health care").
10. See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
11. The difference in utilization cost the Medicare program $28 million in 1987. See RICHARD
P. KUSSEROW, FinancialArrangements Between Physicians and HealthcareBusinesses, No. OAI12-88-01411 (May 1989) (US Dept. of Health and Human Services Report to Congress) [hereinafter
HHS Report, May 1989].
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000).
13. See id. § 1395nn(d)(3).
14. Hearing on Ohio H.B. 71 Before the Ohio House Health and Family Services Comm.,
125th General Assembly (2003) (statement of Theresa Brooks, on behalf of the Ohio Hospital
Association), http://www.ohanet.org/advocacy/state/issues/testimony/conflictO812O3brooks.pdf (last
visited Jan. 17, 2004); see also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Specialty Hospitals:
Geographic Location, Services Provided, and FinancialPerformance, GAO-04-167, at 6-7 (Oct.
2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT, Oct. 2003].
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behavior of physician investors. Critics have focused public attention on two
prominent issues: the increase of troublesome physician self-referral
arrangements and the ability of physician-owned specialty hospitals to steer
the most profitable patients away from general acute-care hospitals.
Commentators have pressed for limitations on self-referral by physician
investors in specialty hospitals. In contrast, advocates of specialty hospitals
assert that there is no evidence that self-referral by physician investors in
specialty hospitals results in increased utilization and that efforts to restrict
self-referral are merely an attempt by general hospitals to quash the
competition.
Concern over physician self-referral at specialty hospitals has triggered a
range of responses from federal and state legislatures, regulatory agencies,
and competing general acute-care hospitals. 15 In 2003, two federal bills were
introduced to amend the whole hospital exception and restrict self-referral by
physician investors in specialty hospitals. 16 In November 2003, in lieu of
enacting self-referral prohibitions via these bills, the 108th U.S. Congress
imposed an eighteen-month moratorium on physician self-referral at newly
developed specialty hospitals and mandated extensive studies of self-referral
The reports generated by the
practices at specialty hospitals.17
congressionally mandated studies, which are due approximately three months
before the moratorium expires, will provide critical information regarding
self-referral patterns and the extent to which these practices affect local health

15. For example, in May 2003, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS")
announced its plan to propose a regulation that would prohibit physician investment in surgical and
other specialty hospitals by revising the whole hospital exception. However, in anticipation of
congressional action, CMS subsequently withdrew the proposal. See Physician Ownership in
Specialty Hospitals, 68 Fed. Reg. 30214 (2003). Other legislative proposals include: "requiring
specialty hospitals to accept Medicaid and indigent patients, requiring the same quality and patientsafety standards for specialty and general hospitals, requiring specialty hospitals to have full-service
emergency departments, and enacting certificate-of-need laws aimed at curbing excess capacity."
Specialty Hospital Building Boom Threatens General Hospitals-Health Care Construction in
Focus, HEALTHCARE REV., Sept. 16, 2003, availableat http://articles.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_
mOHSV/is_8_16/ai_108195480 (last visited June 30, 2004). Administrators of general hospitals
have undertaken a variety of initiatives to discourage physician investment in specialized facilities,
including: building their own specialty facilities, forming joint ventures with local physicians, or
attempting to offer physicians some of the advantages of a freestanding facility, such as improved
scheduling and staffing. See id In a more controversial effort, some general hospitals have sought
to discourage physician investment in competing specialized facilities by denying admission
privileges to new physicians who have a financial interest in a competing facility. See Mahan v.
Avera St. Luke's Hospital, 621 N.W.2d 150, 153 (S.D. 2001).
16. See Hospital Investment Act of 2003, H.R. 1539, 108th Cong. §§ 1-2 (2003); The
Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, H.R. 1, 108th Cong. § 453 (2003).
17. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 § 507 (2003).
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care markets.
As the self-referral moratorium edges closer to its mandated expiration
date, policymakers should examine the role that self-referral plays in the
development and operation of local specialty hospitals and carefully review
the upcoming self-referral studies.
In addition, policymakers should
anticipate a return to the debate regarding the enactment of self-referral
limitations and a renewed discussion of the previously proposed federal
restrictions. However, certain aspects of the proposed federal self-referral
legislation may diminish the restrictions' effectiveness in limiting physician
self-referral, particularly in areas where physician-owned specialty hospitals
have an established presence.
Therefore, lawmakers must familiarize
themselves with the complex issues that surround physician self-referral at
specialty hospitals and closely examine the previously proposed statutory
limitations. This Comment will provide an overview of the issues and
highlight potential problems with proposed self-referral limitations.
Part II of this Comment provides background concerning specialty
hospitals, including what types of facilities are considered specialty hospitals
and data regarding prevalence, proliferation, and physician ownership. Part
III provides an overview of the debate concerning the enactment of selfreferral limitations for physician investors in specialty hospitals. Included in
this section is a more detailed description of concerns regarding physician
self-referral and patient selection by physician investors in specialty hospitals.
The contentions of commentators who oppose self-referral restrictions are
discussed and criticized. Part IV describes ethical standards promulgated by
professional organizations, provides a brief overview of existing federal and
state self-referral legislation, and addresses the applicability of existing
legislation to physician investors in specialty hospitals. Part V reviews the
proposed federal legislation and the moratorium imposed by the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003. Part VI
provides a discussion of potential flaws in the self-referral proposals and
concludes with some recommendations for legislators.
II. SPECIALTY HOSPITALS
A. Definition
Generally, specialty hospitals are health care facilities that focus on
performing certain procedures or on treating patients with particular diseases

18. See id.
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or conditions.'

completed

9

In 2003, the U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO")

two major studies regarding specialty hospitals.20

GAO

researchers classified a hospital as a specialty hospital if more than two-thirds

of its Medicare patients fell into no more than two major diagnosis categories,
such as cardiac or surgical patients. 21 This group of hospitals was further
classified into five specialization categories: cardiac, orthopedic, surgical,
women's, and other specialty hospitals.22
B. Prevalence and Proliferation
Specialty hospitals represent a small but burgeoning presence in the
national health care market. 23 In an April 2003 GAO report, researchers
identified ninety-two existing cardiac, orthopedic, surgical, and women's
specialty hospitals in operation as of February 2003.24 GAO researchers also
noted a rapid increase in the number of specialized facilities in the recent past;
the number has tripled since 1990,25 with at least another twenty specialty
hospitals under development.26 According to a study released by the Center
27
for Studying Health System Change, a Washington, D.C. health policy
research organization, there are three factors that appear to be driving the

specialty hospital boom: (1) relatively high private and government insurer

reimbursements for certain procedures; (2) physicians' desire for greater
control over working conditions and management decisions; and (3)
physicians'

desire to increase

their income

in the face

of reduced

19. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Specialty Hospitals: Information on National
Market Share, Physician Ownership, and Patients Served, GAO-03-683R, at 1 (Apr. 2003)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT, Apr. 2003].
20. See id; see also GAO REPORT, Oct. 2003, supranote 14.
21. See GAO REPORT, Oct. 2003, supra note 14, at 2.
22. See id.
23. See GAO REPORT, Apr. 2003, supra note 19, at 3.
24. See id. In addition to its examination of prevalence, the April study compared the patients
served by specialty hospitals with those treated in general hospitals in terms of severity of illness and
the extent to which physicians have investment interests in such facilities. See id. at 1.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Id. Recent legislative action has dramatically altered the number of facilities "under
development." In September 2003, after the Ohio House of Representatives passed a two-year
moratorium on the construction of specialty hospitals, at least fifty-six notices of intent to build new
specialty hospitals were filed with the state in order to qualify under the bill's grandfather clause.
See Mark Taylor, Deadline Dash in Ohio: Legislative Limit on Specialty Hospitals May Backfire,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 6, 2003, at 12.
27. The Center for Studying Health System Change is a nonpartisan policy research
organization located in Washington, D.C. that designs and conducts studies focused on the U.S.
health care system. For HSC information, see http://www.hschange.com/index.cgi?file=about (last
visited June 27, 2004).

MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW

[88:413

reimbursement for professional services by capturing a portion of facility

profits.28
C. GeographicConcentration
In October 2003, GAO researchers reported that the distribution of
specialized hospitals is concentrated in states where state policy is least
restrictive of hospital growth. 29 While twenty-eight states have at least one

specialty hospital, the vast majority of these facilities-two-thirds of the
identified specialty hospitals-are located in seven states where hospitals are
permitted to expand capacity or build new facilities without seeking state

approval or demonstrating a community need.3 ° In addition, the October
GAO report indicated that the twenty-six specialty hospitals under
development in 2003 reflected the existing pattern of geographic
concentration, with one hundred percent of developing facilities located in
1

states without health care capacity controls.

3

D. Physician Ownership
While specialty hospitals, such as children's and rehabilitation hospitals,

have existed for generations, the recent proliferation of specialized facilities
involves a new genre of hospitals: for-profit facilities that are owned entirely
or in part by physician investors.
The April 2003 GAO report found that
more than ninety percent of the specialty hospitals opened since 1990 were
for-profit facilities.33 The GAO also noted that "seventy percent of the

specialty hospitals in existence or under development had [at least] some
physician owners," with physicians averaging slightly more than fifty percent
ownership.34 Approximately twenty percent of specialty hospitals were
28. See Kelly J. Devers et al., Specialty Hospitals: Focused Factories or Cream Skimmers?
Issue Brief No. 62, CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE (Apr. 2003),
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/552/; see also Reed Abelson, Generous Medicare Payments
Spur Specialty HospitalBoom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, at Al, A20.
29. See GAO REPORT, Oct. 2003, supra note 14, at 3-4. Approximately half of the states did
not have such regulations at the time of the study. Id. at 4 n.6. In addition to research regarding
geographic concentration, the GAO examined how specialty hospitals compare to general hospitals
in providing emergency care and other community needs and how specialty and general hospitals
compare in terms of market share and financial health. Id. at 2.
30. See id. at 11. The seven states are Arizona, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, and Texas. Id.
31. See id.
32. See GAO REPORT, Apr. 2003, supra note 19, at 1.
33. See id. at 2. Overall, 74% of specialty hospitals are for-profit, as compared to about 20% of
all general Medicare service hospitals. See id
34. See GAO REPORT, Apr. 2003, supra note 19, at 4. Nearly all the specialized hospitals with
physician owners reported that some of the physicians were members of a single group practice, and
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owned almost entirely by physicians.35 In addition, while GAO researchers
reported that individual physicians owned relatively small shares of their
hospitals-the average individual share being less than two percent at half the
specialty hospitals--"nearly all [of the identified] specialty hospitals with
physician owners reported that some of the owners were members of a single
group practice., 36 In fact, "[i]n about 1 in 10 specialty hospitals, physicians in
a single group practice owned 80 percent or more of the hospital. 37
III. THE DEBATE REGARDING LIMITATIONS ON SELF-REFERRAL BY
PHYSICIAN INVESTORS IN SPECIALTY HOSPITALS

A. Supporters of Self-Referral Restrictions

Many assert that physician ownership of specialty hospitals is problematic
and have advocated limitations on self-referral by physicians with financial
interests in specialty hospitals.38 These commentators generally focus on two
prominent concerns: physician self-referral and patient credentialing and
selection.3 9
1. Physician Self-Referral
According to many commentators, past empirical research strongly
suggests that the self-referral arrangements between physicians and specialty
hospitals will result in increased utilization of medical services, creating
unnecessary inflations in cost and exposing patients to avoidable risks. 40 In
the early 1980s, concern regarding the referral practices of physicians with
investment or ownership interests in nonhospital facilities, such as clinical
laboratories, outpatient surgery centers, diagnostic and imaging centers, and
durable medical equipment companies, motivated a number of studies.41 In
1981, the Michigan Department of Social Services examined the difference
single group practices owned 80% or more in one out often specialty hospitals. Id.at 10.
35. Id. at 8. In the April GAO report, only 5% of specialty hospitals had physician ownership
of less than 20%. Id. at 8-9. Physicians tended to own smaller percentages of cardiac specialty
hospitals (31%), while physicians owned 70% of surgical specialty hospitals. Id.at 9.
36. See id.at 10.
37. Id.
38. See GAO REPORT, Oct. 2003, supra note 14, at 1-2.
39. See id at 1.
40. See, e.g., Medicare Physician Self-Referral-A Bill to Keep Specialty Hospitals From
Skirting the Intent of the Law, U.S. House of Representatives, 107th Cong., (July 12, 2001)
(statement of Congressman Pete Stark), http://www.house.gov/stark/documents/107th/hospital
investstate.html (last visited Jan 17, 2004); GAO REPORT, Oct. 2003, supra note 14, at 1.
41. Theodore N. McDowell, Jr., Physician Self Referral Arrangements: Legitimate Business or
Unethical "Entrepreneurialism," 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 61, 62-63 (1989).
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between patient referrals to clinical laboratories by physician-owners and
referrals by nonowners. 42 Researchers found that patients referred by
physician-owners had forty-one percent more tests than those referred by
nonowners. 4 3 In April 1989, the Office of the Inspector General of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), reported that physicians
who owned or invested in independent clinical laboratories referred Medicare
patients for forty-five percent more laboratory services than physicians
without such interest.44
Researchers in California analyzed the effects of physician self-referral on
physical therapy, psychiatric evaluation, and magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) services covered under California's workers' compensation law in
1992. 45 The study compared self-referral patterns of physician investors to
referral patterns of physicians who directed patients to independent
facilities.4 6 Researchers found patients were referred for physical therapy
twice as often by physician investors.47 In addition, the costs of psychiatric
48
evaluation services were significantly higher in the self-referral group.
Finally, the study noted that of all the MRI scans requested by the selfreferring physicians, thirty-eight percent were found to be medically
inappropriate, as compared to twenty-eight percent of those requested by
physicians in the independent-referral group.49
By the mid-1990s, multiple private, state, and federally funded studies
confirmed previous findings, demonstrating a dramatic increase in the
frequency and expense of medical services provided when self-referral
arrangements exist.50 The increases in utilization and expense caused

42. See HHS Report, May 1989, supra note 11, at 3.
43. See id.
44. See id.at 18.
45. See Alex Swedlow et al., Increased Costs and Rates of Use in the California Workers'
Compensation System as a Result of Self-Referral by Physicians, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1502
(1992).
46. Id. at 1503.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1504.
49. Id
50. See D. Hemenway et al., Physicians' Responses to FinancialIncentives-Evidence From a
For-profit Ambulatory Care Center, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1059 (1990) (finding that physicians
increased the number of laboratory tests performed per patient visit by 23% when their compensation
was linked to the gross income they generated individually); Bruce J. Hillman et al., Physicians'
Utilization and Charges for Outpatient Diagnostic Imaging in a Medicare Population,268 JAMA
2050 (1992) (finding that physicians who own imaging technology order diagnostic imaging in the
evaluation of their patients significantly more often than physicians who refer imaging examinations
to radiologists); B.J. Hillman et al., Frequency and Costs of DiagnosticImaging in Office PracticeA Comparison of Self-Referring and Radiologist-ReferringPhysicians, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1604

2004]

PHYSICIAN INVESTMENT IN SPECIALTY HOSPITALS

significant escalations in costs. 5' For example, a study in Florida concluded
that Medicare costs in 1990 would have been approximately ten million
dollars less if physicians with a financial interest in imaging centers ordered
imaging services at the same rates as other Florida physicians. 2
2. Patient Credentialing and Selection
The ability of physician investors to self-refer patients to specialty
hospitals forms the basis of another prominent concern: the tendency of
specialty hospitals and individual physician investors to select the most
profitable patients. The financial value of patient selection requires an
understanding of the Medicare Prospective Payment System ("PPS"). Before
the system was in place, physicians and hospitals were reimbursed by thirdparty payers based on the actual costs incurred in caring for a particular
patient. 3 Hospitals, physicians, and patients had no incentive to contain the
number or expense of services utilized in the course of treatment.5 4 Indeed,
hospitals and physicians, who were compensated for each service provided,
had incentives to expand services and extend the patient's length of stay. 55 In
an effort to combat these incentives and stem rapidly rising costs, Medicare
implemented the PPS in 1983.56
The PPS was designed to give providers cost-cutting incentives by
(1990) (finding that physicians who used imaging equipment located in their offices (self-referring)
ordered imaging examinations at least four times more often than physicians who referred their
patients to radiologists for imaging services); Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, Physician Ownership
of Physical Therapy Services: Effects on Charges, Utilization, Profits, and Service Characteristics,
268 JAMA 2055 (1992) (finding that per patient visits were 39% to 45% higher at freestanding
physical therapy and rehabilitation facilities owned by referring physicians and that gross and net
revenue per patient were 30% to 40% higher in such facilities; also finding that joint ventures
involving physicians generate more of their revenues from patients with well-paying insurance); Jean
M. Mitchell & Jonathon H. Sunshine, Consequences of Physicians' Ownership of Health Care
Facilities-JointVentures in Radiation Therapy, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1497 (1992) (finding that
the frequency and costs of radiation therapy treatments at free-standing centers in Florida were 40%
to 60% higher than in the rest of the United States; 44% of the centers in Florida were joint ventures
with physician owners, compared to 7% of centers located elsewhere.).
51. See Mitchell & Sunshine, supra note 50, at 1499.
52. See id. In addition to staggering increases in costs, the referral of patients for unnecessary
diagnostic or therapeutic procedures exposes individual patients to unnecessary risks and may
adversely affect an individual patient's health. See Medicare "'Self-Referral" Law: HearingBefore
the Subcommittee on Health of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (May 13,
1999) (statement of D. McCarty Thornton, Chief Counsel to the Inspector General, Office of the
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), http://waysandmeans.house.
govihearings.asp?formmode=archive&hearing= 191 (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
53. See RODWIN, supra note 6, at 15.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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providing reimbursement at a fixed amount irrespective of the actual costs of

caring for a patient. 57 The Medicare PPS assumes that treating patients with
the same diagnosis should cost roughly the same amount; therefore, Medicare
will pay a predetermined amount based upon the "Diagnosis Related Group"
into which a Medicare patient's condition falls.58 Because the actual cost

incurred is not a factor in determining reimbursement, the PPS provides a
strong financial incentive to decrease the cost of patient care. 59 Likewise,

because Medicare payments are not reduced if fewer services are needed,
providers can benefit financially if they select patients who are less medically
complicated. a

Specialty hospitals may indirectly select profitable patients by limiting the
scope of services they provide.6 1 While this strategy may be troublesome,
clearly the more concerning aspect of profitable patient selection at physicianowned specialty hospitals is that physician self-referral at specialty hospitals
may promote "patient credentialing" by physician investors6 2 Patient
credentialing 63 is the physician's use of an individual patient's medical or
57. See generally James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health
Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 205, 208 (1996).
58. Diagnostic Related Groups are the basis for Medicare Part A payments under the
prospective inpatient payment system. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Acute
Inpatient ProspectivePayment System, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/providers/hipps/back
ground.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
59. See GAO REPORT, Oct. 2003, supra note 14, at 6.
60. In a March 2000 report, the Medicare Payment Review Advisory Commission
("MedPAC") noted the costs incurred providing care for patients who are more seriously ill may be
substantially higher. See GAO REPORT, Apr. 2003, supra note 19, at 12 n.1l. MedPAC
recommends that the DRG system be refined to reflect illness severity more accurately. Specifically,
MedPAC recommends that the number of DRG categories be expanded to reflect more fully
coexisting conditions and complications, and that the calculation of the DRG's relative weights be
modified to reflect better the relative costliness of cases across DRGs. MEDICARE PAYMENT
ADVISORY COMMISSION, Report to the Congress: Rethinking Medicare's Payment Policies for
Graduate Medical
Education
and Teaching Hospitals,
at
9
(Aug.
1999),
http://www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional-reports/august99.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
61. Critics contend specialty hospitals concentrate on services that are subject to better rates of
reimbursement. See GAO REPORT, Oct. 2003, supra note 14, at 1.
62. The author has not observed the use of the term "patient credentialing" in the literature.
The term "economic credentialing" has been used in the context of the physician-hospital
relationship to describe a hospital's use of economic criteria in determining a physician's
qualifications for medical staff membership or privileges. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, Policy Statement H-230.975, available at http://www.amaassn.org/apps/pfnew/pf~online?fn=browse&doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-230.975.HTM
(last visited
Oct. 1, 2004).
63. The practice of patient credentialing can be considered analogous to the process of
ratemaking by health insurers. A health insurer attempts to achieve an accurate estimate of future
losses based upon the characteristics and historical data of a certain population.
See
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INSURING THE UNINSURED: OPTIONS AND ANALYSIS, House
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financial information to determine the relative financial risk of caring for that
patient. 64
Physician investors in specialty hospitals are uniquely positioned to
engage in patient credentialing and selection because they have largely
unrestricted access to their patients' medical, insurance, and employment
information, as well as the ability to refer patients to the facility of their
choosing (within the constraints of health insurers). Riskier patients, both
medically and financially, can be65referred to facilities in which the physician
does not have a financial interest.
Patient credentialing may have a significant negative impact on competing
community hospitals.66 Unlike physicians, general hospitals have limited
access to information and generally do not restrict or control patient
admissions based upon severity of illness. Federal legislation also prohibits
some general hospitals from turning away patients based upon their ability to
pay. 6 7 Numerous commentators assert that drawing away profitable patients
frustrates the ability of general hospitals to fulfill the broader needs of the
community, such as the need for charity care, emergency services, and
Comm. On Education & Labor, Comm. Print (1988), excerpted in HEALTH LAW: CAES, MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS, supra note 8, at 512-15. It is distinguished from the ratemaking process, however,
in that insurers generally use historical or experience ratings based upon a segment of the population,
whereas patient credentialing focuses on an individual patient's medical and financial status. Id.
64. In recent literature, this process is referred to as "cherry-picking" or "cream-skimming."
See Joe Manning, GAO Hospital Report Finds Disparities,MILW. J. SENTINEL, Oct. 23, 2003, at 3D
(reporting that U.S. Rep. Jerry Kleczka (D-Wis.) asserted that "specialty hospitals 'cherry pick"'
healthier patients, leaving sicker, costlier patients for the general, not-for-profit hospitals); see also
Leigh Page, Battle Lines: Acute Care and Specialty Hospitals Square Off in Turf Wars Over
Lucrative Medical Procedures, MOD. PHYSICIAN, Mar. 1, 2003, at 14 (noting that acute-care
hospitals complain that physician investors send the more lucrative cases to the specialty hospital in
which they have a financial interest, leaving less profitable patients for local general hospitals). The
term "patient credentialing" is used here as synonymous with, but more descriptive than, "cherrypicking." The author notes that most health care consumers, particularly those in need of intense
services, such as angioplasty or cardiac bypass surgery, do not regard themselves as "cherries." Id.
65. See Page, supra note 64, at 14.
66. Trudi L. Matthews, The Debate Over Specialty Hospitals, 46 STATE GOv'T NEWS 28
(2003).
67. In 1986, Congress enacted EMTALA to ensure public access to emergency services
regardless of ability to pay. Section 1867 of the Social Security Act requires Medicare-participating
hospitals that offer emergency services to provide a medical screening examination for an emergency
medical condition regardless of an individual's ability to pay. Hospitals are then required to provide
stabilizing treatment for all patients with EMCs. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act ("EMTALA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd (implementing regulations at 42 C.F.R. § 489.24).
Many specialty hospitals do not offer emergency services, and therefore are not subject to EMTALA
requirements. See GAO REPORT, Oct. 2003, supra note 14, at 17. In 2003, GAO researchers noted
that only 45% of specialty hospitals in existence had emergency departments, compared with 92% of
general hospitals. See id. Notably, less than half of the emergency departments at specialty hospitals
were staffed by physicians twenty-four hours per day. Id. at 20.
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standby capacity to respond to community-wide disasters. 68
There is empirical evidence that physician-owned specialty hospitals tend
to select less medically complicated, and therefore more profitable, patients.6 9
In 2003, the GAO compared the inpatient discharge data from twenty-five
urban specialty hospitals to the discharge data from local general hospitals.7 °
Researchers used a widely recognized system to assign an illness severity
level to each patient. 71 The analysis revealed that eighty percent of the
specialty hospitals examined 72 treated fewer severely ill patients than local
general hospitals.7 3 For example, GAO researchers noted that three percent of
the patients at one Texas orthopedic hospital were classified as severely ill,
while eight percent of patients with similar diagnoses were classified as
severely ill at the fifty-one general hospitals in the same urban area.74
Researchers also noted that "[f]or all four specialty hospital categoriescardiac, orthopedic, surgical and women's-the median share of severely ill
patients treated was lower than the median share of severely ill patients in the
same diagnostic categories treated at corresponding general hospitals. 75
There is also evidence that specialty hospitals tend to select more
profitable patients based on public program participation.76 In the October
2003 GAO report, researchers noted that specialty hospitals tended to treat a
lower percentage of Medicaid participants than general hospitals across all
four specialization classifications.7 7 For example, while approximately five
percent of surgical patients served at general hospitals were Medicaid
participants, such patients comprised only one percent at specialty hospitals.7 8

68. See id. at 1; See also Tony Fong, Competitive Risks: Specialty Hospitals Criticized at
Justice, FTC Hearingsfor EndangeringCommunity Facilities,MOD. HEALTHCARE, Mar. 31, 2003,
at 6; S.B. 828 §§ 1(c)-(f), 2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (finding that "[t]he ability of a hospital to
continue to provide emergency services to California's insured and uninsured patients is threatened
by so-called 'boutique hospitals"'). This drawing away of profitable patients has also created
significant tension between physicians and some general hospitals, particularly when general
hospitals seek to stop their losses by denying privileges to physician investors in competing facilities.
See Reed Abelson, Barred as Rivals, Doctors See Some Hospitals in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13,
2004, at CI.
69. See GAO REPORT, Apr. 2003, supra note 19, at 11.
70. Id.
71. Id. The system is referred to as the All Payer Refined Diagnosis Related Groups. Id.
72. Id. The specialty hospitals were located in eighteen urban areas in six states: Arizona, North
Carolina, New Jersey, New York, California, and Texas. Id.
73. Id.at 12.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See GAO REPORT, Oct. 2003, supra note 14, at 20.
77. See id
78. Id.
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Similarly, while six percent of patients receiving cardiac services at general

hospitals were Medicaid participants, such patients accounted for only three
percent of those treated at cardiac specialty hospitals.79
B. Opponents of Self-Referral Restrictions
Opponents of prohibitions on physician self-referral at specialty hospitals

contend that initiatives to restrict self-referral are premature and have been
pursued without clear evidence of a linkage between increased utilization and
physician ownership of specialty hospitals.80
However, past research
regarding physician self-referral has demonstrated a significant increase in
utilization when physicians self-refer patients to imaging facilities, laboratory
facilities, freestanding physical therapy and rehabilitation facilities, radiation
therapy treatment centers, and psychiatric treatment centers. 8 1 Critics of selfreferral prohibitions often neglect these studies or fail to offer a rationale for
asserting that physician self-referral at specialty hospitals is unlikely to result

in similar outcomes.82
Other opponents of self-referral restrictions assert that such limitations are
anticompetitive and are not intended to address the conflict of interest
confronted by physician investors, but rather represent "a misguided attempt
to keep free-market forces from working some magic in the woefully
inefficient health care services sector" by curbing the growth of specialty
hospitals. 83 Indeed, although the 2003 moratorium merely prohibits selfreferral by physician investors in newly developed specialty hospitals, a fact
widely misunderstood and misreported by the popular press, the self-referral
moratorium is generally regarded as a significant impediment to the

79. Id. See also Heidi R. Centrella, General Acute-Care Hospitals Compete With Specialty
Hospitals For ProfitablePatients, J. REC. (Oklahoma City), June 21, 2004, for a report that a local
general hospital showed a net profit of nearly $39 million, (about $71,000 profitability per bed) with
41% of patients in Medicare and 19% in Medicaid. On the other hand, a neighboring orthopedic
specialty hospital showed a net profit of about $17.6 million (nearly $1 million profitability per bed),
with only 11% of patients in Medicare and 0% of patients in Medicaid. See id.
80. See Clark Bell, Legal Interference: When It Comes to Specialty Hospitals, Let the Market
Decide, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Mar. 29, 2004, at 20; see also Sarah Swartzmeyer & Carrie Norbin
Killoran, Specialty Hospital Ban was Premature; Studies Would Have Shown Whether Those
FacilitiesHelp or Harm Healthcare,MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 12, 2004, at 21.
81. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
82. See Swartzmeyer & Norbin Killoran, supra note 80, at 21. These critics also overlook the
possibility that while pending research may not demonstrate an increase in utilization, such research
may conclude that self-referral practices of physician investors at specialty hospitals results in the
questionable practice of patient credentialing and selection.
83. See Bell, supra note 80, at 20; See also Julie Piotrowski, Niche FacilitiesHit; Moratorium
Raises New Self-Referral Issues ForDocs, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 22, 2003, at 28.
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development of specialty hospitals. 8 4 This supposition underscores the extent
to which physician self-referral is the linchpin of specialty hospitals' financial
success and begs the question: If specialty hospitals provide superior care,
why is the financial viability of specialty hospitals threatened when physician
self-referral is restricted or eliminated?
In addition, these "let-the-market-decide" commentators appear to rely on
free-market principles in an industry that is so heavily and extensively
regulated it is difficult to conceive of it as a competitive free market.85
Ideally, a free-market system produces the most efficient allocation of
resources. 86 However, market failures occur when the essential characteristics
of a free market, including a competitive environment in which no one buyer
or seller is large enough to influence price, do not exist.87 As the authors of a
Congressional Budget Report on rising health care costs noted,
To achieve such efficiencies . . . free markets must operate under
certain conditions. They work best when the consumer has good
information about the characteristics of products and their prices ....
In addition, market efficiency requires that a large number of sellers
compete with each other over prices that reflect true resource costs.
With a large number of sellers, no single vendor has the power to
control prices, and price competition among sellers lowers prices to
the point that they reflect the marginal costs of production. The

84. Bruce Jaspen, Medicare Law a Brake on Specialty Hospitals, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2004,
BUSINESS ZONE C, at 3 (stating that "[t]he Medicare reform package.., put an 18-month
moratorium on the development of new specialty hospitals"); Marsha Austin, Bill Targets Specialty
Hospitals by BarringReferrals, DENVER POST, Jan. 28, 2004, BUSINESS, at Cl (stating that "[lhate
last year Congress put an 18-month moratorium on payments to new specialty hospitals"); Amy
Goldstein, Medicare Law Stunts Hospital Rival; Growth of Specialty Care Centers Slowed While
Impact Studied, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2003, at A35 (claiming the Medicare law will "slow the
development of [specialty] hospitals by forbidding physicians to make new investments in them for
the next 18 months").
85. Others argue that a laissez faire approach does not recognize the public service
responsibilities of hospitals. See Bill Walsh, Breaux Targets Doctors' Specialty Hospitals;
Advocates Contend Care There is Superior,TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 20, 2003, at 1.
86. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECON.

IMPLICATIONS OF RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS

(1992), excerpted in HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 8, at 478. In the
ideal free market, "[s]ellers' behavior, expressed as supply, interacts with buyers' behavior, expressed
as demand, at the point of equilibrium which determines market price. This price reflects the point at
which the amount of goods buyers want to purchase equals the amount of goods sellers wish to sell.
At any other price, buyers and sellers would have incentives to change their behavior until the
quantities supplied and demanded become mutually consistent." Julie E. Mathews, The Physician
Self-Referral Dilemma: Enforcing Antitrust Law as a Solution, 19 AM. J. L. & MED. 523, 529-530
(1993) (citations and footnotes omitted).
87. James L. Huffman, The Impact of Regulation on Small and Emerging Business, 4 J. SMALL
& EMERGING Bus. L. 307, 312 (2000).
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market for health care, however, does not meet many of these
conditions. 8
In the present health care system, market failure occurs because, among
other reasons, the federal government fixes the price for services. 89 Under an
economic theory of regulation, when market failures occur, regulations such
as the proposed
self-referral restrictions are necessary in order to promote
90
social welfare.

Furthermore, these same free-market proponents abandon their laissez
faire assertions and seek government intervention when community hospitals
react competitively and deny or withdraw the privileges of physicians who
invest in and refer to competing specialized facilities.91 This seems to result
in the untenable position that a physician should be permitted to engage in
economic credentialing of his or her patients, but legislation should be enacted
(or existing legislation interpreted) to prevent hospitals from the economic
credentialing of physicians.
However, the contention that specialty hospitals should not be targeted by
self-referral legislation is not without merit. If the growth and development of
specialty hospitals is detrimental to local health care markets, initiatives
should be undertaken to address this problem by legislative or administrative
initiatives that are separate from those intended to address physician conflicts
of interest.
88. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at 478.
89. According to one author:
[T]he health care market [in the U.S.] "departs substantially from competitive conditions."
Due to the nature of the health care industry, market failures prevent competition from
achieving its potential. Such failures endemic to the health care market include payment
by insurance companies for most of patients' health care expenses without regard to cost

and appropriateness of care, thus increasing patients' incentives to demand all of the care
the doctor recommends, and increasing physicians' incentives to render more care than
patients may truly need. Provider influence over the market through collusive behavior
reflects another health care market failure. This influence reduces the benefits of
competition which occur when providers act independently.
Mathews, supranote 86, at 530 (citations and footnotes omitted).
90. See id.
91. See Leigh Page, Battle Lines: Acute Care and Specialty Hospitals Square Off in Turf Wars
Over Lucrative Medical Procedures, MOD. PHYSICIAN, Mar. 1, 2003, at 14 (noting that while
physician investors in specialty hospitals deny they are skimming away the most profitable patients,
acute-care facilities are denying or threatening to deny physicians privileges in an attempt to reduce
their losses). Meanwhile, attorneys opposed to these measures suggest that physicians employ
federal antikickback laws to prohibit the denial of privileges. Id; see also Mark Taylor, Striking
Back at Doc Investors: OhioHealthPulls HospitalPrivilegesfor Physicians in Largest Revocation to
Date, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 26, 2004, at 10.
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IV. EXISTING SELF-REFERRAL RESTRICTIONS
A. Ethical Considerations

In response to concerns regarding the integrity of the physician-patient
relationship, various professional medical associations have established
ethical guidelines that either permit self-referral within certain parameters, or
prohibit the practice entirely.92 The American Medical Association Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs has developed guidelines that discourage, but
do not prohibit, self-referral. 93
In contrast, the American College of Radiology ("ACR") has assumed a
more stringent position, prohibiting physician self-referral.9 4 According to the
ACR:
The practice of physicians referring patients to health care facilities in
which they have a financial interest is not in the best interest of
patients. Self-referral may improperly influence the professional
judgments of those physicians referring patients to such facilities.
When such an arrangement exists, radiologists ...should make efforts
to restructure the ownership of the facility. 95
Interestingly, the current position of the American College of Radiology
regarding physician self-referral differs significantly from its original
position.9 6 In the early 1980s, the ACR debated the merits and disadvantages

92. See U.S. House of Representatives, Ways and Means Comm., Subcomm. on Health, 106th
Cong. (May 13, 1999) (prepared testimony of J. Bruce Hauser, M.D., FACR of the American
College of Radiology), availableat http://www.waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy.asp?file-legacy/
health/I06Cong/5-13-99/5-13haus.htm (last visited June 27, 2004).
93. See "Conflicts of Interest: Physician Ownership of Medical Facilities," adopted Dec. 1991
(JAMA. 1992; 267: 2366-69) and Updated June 1994 ("In general, physicians should not refer
patients to a health care facility outside their office practice at which they do not directly provide care
or services when they have an investment interest in the facility .... Physicians may invest in and
refer to an outside facility, whether or not they provide direct care or services at the facility, if there
is a demonstrated need in the community for the facility and alternative financing is not available.").
For the updated policy, see AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, E-8.032 Conflicts of Interest: Health
Facility Ownership by a Physician, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8472.html.
94. See American College of Radiology Article XIII, § 2, note 4. Code of Ethics 2003-2004
ACR Bylaws (Incorporating ACR Council Changes Approved at the 2003 Annual Meeting),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/7665-4674.html (last visited June 27, 2004).
95. Id.
96. See Medicare "Self-Referral" Law, HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Health of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (May 13, 1999) (statement by J. Bruce Hauser, M.D.,
FACR, American College of Radiology), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy.aspfile=legacy
/health/1 06cong/5-13-99/5-13haus.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
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of self-referral arrangements and initially adopted a position that radiologists
could ethically participate in such ventures, with a warning that financial
97
arrangements should be carefully structured to avoid conflicts of interest.
However, in 1988 the ACR policymaking council revised this position after
finding that "the potential for, and actual abuse and exploitation of patients by
unethical practices, and the flagrant disregard of physicians'
ethical
' 98
responsibilities to the patient to be so great and so pervasive.
B. Legal Restrictions on Physician Self-Referral

1. Federal Legislation
Restrictions on the practice of self-referral exist at both the state and
federal levels. In the late 1980s, concern over the consistent and costly
increases in utilization that resulted from physician self-referral arrangements
led the U.S. Congress to consider legislation directed at physician selfreferral. In August 1988, Representative Fortney "Pete" Stark (D-Cal.)
introduced H.R. 5198, a bill intended "to provide civil monetary penalties and
other remedies for certain improper referral arrangements for services
provided under the Medicare program." 99 In 1989, the U.S. Congress passed
the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act ("Stark I"),l °° establishing some restrictions
on physician self-referral. '01
Stark I prohibits physicians from referring Medicare patients for clinical
laboratory services to entities in which they, or members of their immediate
family, have an ownership or investment interest, unless an exception

97. See id
98. Id. The revised ACR policy states:
The practice of physicians referring patients to health care facilities in which they have a
financial interest is not in the best interest of patients. This practice of self-referral may
also serve as an improper economic incentive for the provision of unnecessary treatment of
services. Even the appearance of such conflicts or incentives can compromise professional
integrity. Disclosing referring physicians' investment interests to patients or implementing
other affirmative procedures to reduce, but not completely eliminate, the potential for
abuse created by self-referral is not sufficient .... The American College of Radiology
believes that radiologists and radiation oncologists should make efforts to restructure the
ownership interests in existing imaging or radiation therapy facilities because self-referral
may improperly influence the professional judgments of those physicians referring patients
to such facilities.
Id.
99. Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1988, H.R. 5198, 100th Cong. (1988).
100. So-called for the bill's principal sponsor, Rep. Fortney "Pete" Stark.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000).
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In addition, the Act prohibits entities from making a claim for

payment under the Medicare program for clinical laboratory services
furnished pursuant to a prohibited referral. 0 3 In 1993, Stark I was expanded
by the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act ("Stark II",). 104 Stark II

extends the prohibitions contained in Stark I to Medicaid programs and
to ten additional categories of Designated Health
expands 0restrictions
5
Services.'
2. State Legislation
Following the promulgation of the Stark laws and regulations, almost all

states enacted self-referral statutes; however, the content of such legislation
varies widely. 10 6 For example, a North Carolina statute provides, "[a] health

care provider shall not make any referral of any patient to any entity in which
the health care provider or group practice or any member of the group practice
is an investor."' 7 Other states prohibit self-referral unless the investment
interest was established prior to a certain date and the interest is disclosed to
patients. 0 8 In Florida, a health care provider may not self-refer, unless the

self-referral relationship meets a number of requirements and the interest is
disclosed to patients.

09

Still others permit self-referral, requiring only that

102. An "ownership or investment interest" is defined to include "equity, debt, or other means
and includes an interest in an entity that holds an ownership or investment interest in any entity
providing the designated health service." Id.§ 1395nn(a).
103. Id. § 1395nn(a)(1)(B).
104. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Stark II), Pub. L. No. 103-66, §13562, 107
Stat. 312 (1993).
105. The ten affected services include the following: physical therapy services; occupational
therapy services, radiology services and supplies; radiation therapy services and supplies; durable
media equipment and supplies; parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies; prosthetics,
orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies; home health services; outpatient prescription drugs;
and inpatient and outpatient hospital services. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6). In 1993, Rep. Pete Stark
was unsuccessful in his attempt to expand the self-referral ban to all payers. See Comprehensive
Physician Ownership and Referral Act of 1993, H.R. 345, 103rd Cong. (1993).
106. For a thorough discussion of various state laws, see Jennifer Herndon Puryear, Comment,
The Physician as Entrepreneur:State and FederalRestrictions on Physician Joint Ventures, 73 N.C.
L. REV. 293 (1994).
107. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-406(a) (2003). The statute further provides that any entity that
collects payment for services rendered as a result of a prohibited referral must refund such amount to
the payor or the individual within ten days. See § 90-406(c). Interestingly, as of June 2004,
MedCath, Inc., a developer of cardiovascular specialty hospitals incorporated in North Carolina,
which operates at least thirteen such facilities across the nation, does not have a specialty hospital
located in North Carolina. See MedCath Inc. Facilities, http://www.medcath.com/index.aspx?
COREElementlD=corpFacilities (last visited June 28, 2004).
108. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-22.5 (West 1991).
109. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.053(5) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004). In the October 2003 GAO
report, Florida, which has certificate-of-need legislation and a more developed self-referral statute,
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physicians disclose their investment interests to patients.'l
Interestingly, the seven states in which specialty hospitals are
concentrated"' also have relatively permissive physician self-referral
provisions. For example, Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota permit physician self-referral arrangements, requiring only that
physicians disclose financial interests to patients." 2 Texas allows self-referral
unless the referral is for home or community support services and the3
arrangement violates federal self-referral prohibitions (Stark laws)." 1
California prohibits physician self-referral for patients seeking services under
California's workers' compensation laws," 4 but allows all other self-referral
as long as the physician's return on the investment is not a function of the
number of patients referred and the interest is disclosed to patients.' 15
C. Applicability ofLegislative Self-Referral Restrictions on Physician
Investors in Specialty Hospitals.
While most state provisions simply do not address the self-referral
practices of physician investors in specialty hospitals, 1 6 the Stark self-referral
restrictions contain a loophole that permits self-referral by physician investors
in specialty hospitals." 7 Under Stark's "whole hospital exception," a referral
by a physician with a financial interest in a hospital is not subject to the Stark
self-referral prohibition if (1) "the referring physician is authorized to perform
services at the hospital" and (2) "the ownership or investment interest is in the
entire hospital itself (and not merely in a subdivision of the hospital)."" 8 The

had only one to two specialty hospitals. See GAO REPORT Oct. 2003, supra note 14, at 12 fig.2.
110. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1744(B) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
111. See GAO REPORT, Oct. 2003, supra note 14, at 11. The seven states are: Arizona,
California, Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas. Id.
112. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1854(35) (West 2002 & Supp. 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-2837(29) (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 37:1744 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 59, § 725.4 (West 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-2-19 (Michie 1999).
113. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 142.019 (Vernon 2001).
114. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 139.3(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
115. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 650 (West 2003); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
654.1-654.2 (West 2003).
116. See Puryear, supranote 106.
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(3) (2003).
118. See id Other Stark exceptions permit physician investment in health care facilities when
patient referrals to such entities would result in minimal financial gain or when alternative financing
for the development of such entities is not available. See id.§ 1395nn(c)-(d). For example, a
physician is not subject to the referral prohibition if the physician's ownership is in a publicly traded
company with $75 million in stockholder equity or by the ownership of mutual funds with total
assets exceeding $75 million. Id. § 1395nn(c)(1)(B)(2). Additional provisions exclude ownership
and investment interests in hospitals in Puerto Rico and rural areas. Id. § 1395nn(d)(1H2).
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term "hospital" is not defined within the statute. Although specialty hospitals
tend to resemble a subdivision or subpart of a general hospital because they
are relatively small,11 9 offer a limited range of services, and may provide a
significant stake in profitability, such facilities have been considered "whole
hospitals" and fall within the exception. Therefore, physicians who invest in
specialty hospitals are currently not subject to Stark self-referral restrictions.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND THE MORATORIUM
In 2003, two federal bills were proposed to limit self-referral by physician
investors in specialty hospitals: the Hospital Investment Act of 2003120 and
the Breaux-Nickles-Lincoln Amendment ("Breaux Amendment") to the
Medicare prescription drug bill. 121
A. The HospitalInvestment Act
On April 1, 2003, Representatives Pete Stark (D-Cal.) and Gerald D.
Kleczka (D-Wis.)
introduced the Hospital Investment Act of
2003.122 According to Representative Stark, self-referral arrangements with
specialty hospitals may induce physician investors to base treatment decisions
on financial factors, rather than on the best interests of the patient, the precise
behavior the Stark laws were written to prevent. 123 Under the bill, physicians
would be prohibited from referring Medicare and Medicaid patients to a
specialty hospital in which they have an investment interest unless the interest
was purchased on terms generally available to the public.' 24 The Act would
have applied only to ownership and investment interests purchased on or after
July 12, 2001.125
B. The Breaux Amendment
A similar amendment, jointly sponsored by Senators John Breaux (D-La.),
119. GAO REPORT, Apr. 2003, supra note 19, at 7. Specialty hospitals are relatively small
when compared to general hospitals.
While the average short-term general hospital has
approximately 170 beds, cardiac specialty hospitals average fifty-nine beds, orthopedic hospitals
average twenty-one, surgical hospitals average sixteen, and women's care hospitals average sixty.
Id at 8 fig.4.
120. Hospital Investment Act of 2003, H.R. 1539, 108th Cong. §§ 1-2 (2003).
121. Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, H.R. 1, 108th Cong. § 453
(2003).
122. Hospital Investment Act of 2003, H.R. 1539, 108th Cong. (2003).
123. See Introduction of The Hospital Investment Act, Apr. 1, 2003 Congressman Pete Stark
(D-Cal.), http://www.house.gov/stark/news/108th/hospitalinvestmentstate.htm (last visited June 28,
2004).
124. Hospital Investment Act of 2003, H.R. 1539, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (2003).
125. Id. § 2(b).
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Don Nickles (R-Okla.), and Blanche Lincoln (D-Ark.) was included in the
Medicare prescription drug bill.1 26 The Breaux Amendment provided that
specialty hospitals be specifically excluded from Stark's whole-hospital
exemption.127 A specialty hospital was narrowly defined within the
amendment to include only those hospitals that primarily or exclusively
provide services to cardiac, orthopedic, surgical, or other specialized
categories of patients. In addition, a grandfather clause in the Breaux
Amendment provided that a specialized facility in operation or development
prior to June 2003 would not be classified as a specialty hospital.128 However,
in order to maintain the exception, such specialized facilities may not increase
the number of physician investors or the total number of beds in their
facilities.' 2 9
C. MedicarePrescriptionDrug,Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003
In lieu of enacting self-referral prohibitions via the Hospital Investment
Act or the Breaux Amendment, the 108th U.S. Congress imposed an eighteenmonth self-referral moratorium that mirrors the Breaux Amendment. 30 Under
§ 507 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003 (the Act),' 3' physician investors are prohibited from self-referral
if their investment interest is in a specialty hospital not in operation or
development as of November 18, 2003.132 Physician investors are also subject
to the self-referral ban if the hospital in which they have a vested interest
increases the number of physician investors, changes or expands its field of
increases the total number
specialization, expands beyond the main campus,
33
of beds, or fails to meet other requirements. 1
Under the new legislation, "specialty hospitals" include cardiac care and
orthopedic hospitals, surgical hospitals, and any other facility that provides
specialized services as designated by the Department of Health and Human
126. See Patrick Reilly, Lobbying Offensive: Congress Asked to Limit Physician Investments,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 29, 2003, at 8. Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvment Act of 2003,
H.R. 1, 108th Cong. § 453 (2003).
127. A specialty hospital was defined within the amendment as a hospital that primarily or
exclusively provides services to cardiac, orthopedic, surgical, or other specialized category of
patients. Id. § 453(a)(7)(A)(i)-(iv).
128. See id. § 453(a)(7)(B)(i)(I).
129. See id. § 453(a)(7)(B).
130. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 § 507(a)(1)(B) (2003).
131. Seeid,
132. See id. § 507(a)(1).

133. See id. § 507(a)(7)(B)(ii)-(v).
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Services. 34 Certain hospitals that provide specialized services are not
considered specialty hospitals for the purpose of the moratorium, including:
psychiatric hospitals, rehabilitation hospitals,
children's hospitals, long-term
35
care hospitals, and certain cancer hospitals.
It is important to note what the Act does not prohibit. The Act does not
restrict or impede the development of,or investment in, specialty hospitals by
physicians or other investors. 136 Nor does the Act deny payment for services
rendered to a patient referred to an existing specialty hospital, even if a
physician investor referred the patient. 137 The Act does not discourage the
referral of patients to specialty hospitals by noninvestor physicians. 38
Finally, the Act does not provide that specialty hospitals cannot expand, but
39
merely that if they do so, physician investors may no longer self-refer.
The new legislation also provides that the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission ("MedPAC") must conduct a study comparing specialty
hospitals with other similar general acute-care hospitals regarding the number
and extent of patients referred by physician investors, the quality of care
provided, and the impact of the specialty hospital on the acute-care general
hospital. 140 MedPAC must also examine differences between specialty and
general hospitals concerning the scope of services furnished, Medicaid
utilization, and the amount of uncompensated care provided. 141
In addition, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) must
provide a report describing "the percentage of patients admitted to physicianowned specialty hospitals who are referred by physicians with an ownership
interest, the referral patterns of physician owners, including the percentage of
patients they referred to physician-owned specialty hospitals, and the
percentage of patients they referred to local full-service community hospitals
for the same condition.' 42 The HHS study must also investigate differences
in quality of care and patient satisfaction and provide data regarding
differences in the provision of uncompensated care. 143 Both the MedPAC and
134. See id. § 507(a)(7)(A)(i)-(iv).
135. See DHHS, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS Manual System, Pub. 10020 One-Time Notification, (Mar. 19, 2004), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pmtrans/
R62OTN.pdf (last visited June 28, 2004).
136. See id. § 507.
137. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
138. See § 507.
139. See id.
140. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 § 507(c)(1) (2003).
141.

See id.

142. See id.§ 507(c)(2).
143. See id.
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HHS reports and any recommendations for legislative or administrative
changes are expected in the spring of 2005.144
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATORS

A. Self-Referral RestrictionsShould Focus on Limiting Physician Conflicts of
Interest
The congressionally mandated studies will provide critical information
with regard to self-referral patterns and will return the attention of
policymakers to the previously proposed self-referral restrictions. Certain
aspects of the proposed restrictions may discourage the proliferation and
expansion of specialty hospitals, but do not effectively limit self-referral and
patient credentialing, particularly in states where physicians and specialty
hospitals have established relationships. If lawmakers conclude that the
growth and development of specialty hospitals is detrimental to local health
care markets, legislation should be directed at this issue, but self-referral
limitations should be focused exclusively on limiting the conflict of interest
that arises for physician investors. In order to effectively limit these conflicts,
legislators need to take action.
B. Lawmakers Should Pressfor ExpandedFederalRestrictions on Physician
Self-Referral
Because federally enacted legislation enjoys the existence of an effective
mechanism of enforcement, specifically the threat of exclusion from Medicare
and Medicaid programs, 145 legislators seeking to limit physician self-referral
and patient credentialing at specialty hospitals should press for expanded
federal restrictions.
1. Lawmakers Should Eliminate Grandfather Clauses Based on Date of
Investment
Lawmakers should consider self-referral provisions that are applicable
regardless of when or how the financial interest was obtained. When the
original physician self-referral laws (Stark laws) were enacted, the U.S.
Congress did not include grandfather provisions to allow certain physician
investors to continue to self-refer if his or her interest was obtained prior to a
144. The new legislation mandates that the reports are due fifteen months after the date of
enactment and are therefore expected sometime during March 2005. See id. § 507(c)(3).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g) (2000). Violators of the Stark self-referral prohibitions are subject
to a range of civil sanctions, including nonpayment for the services provided, monetary penalties, and
the exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid programs. Id.
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certain date. 146 Under the existing Stark laws, if a physician self-referral
arrangement does not fall within one- of the specified exceptions, the selfreferral prohibition applies regardless of when the physician obtained the
ownership or investment interest. 147 In contrast, both the Hospital Investment
Act and the Breaux Amendment contain provisions permitting self-referral by
physician investors in specialty hospitals if certain criteria are met prior to
specified dates. 148 In communities where specialty hospitals already have an
established presence in the local market, the grandfather clauses
contained in
49
both proposals would allow continued physician self-referral. 1
2. Lawmakers Should Eliminate Grandfather Clauses Based on Date of
Hospital Development
Instead of exempting the ownership interests obtained prior to a certain
date, a grandfather clause within the Breaux Amendment provides that the
specialty hospital itself, if in operation or development prior to June 2003, is
not classified as a specialty hospital. 50 Thus, under the whole hospital
exception, original physician investors in these existing facilities can continue
to self-refer. 15' However, all physician investors become subject to the
moratorium if the specialty hospital adds physician investors or capacity.
This provision is troublesome because it stifles the growth and development
of existing specialty hospitals, reduces the potential for competing specialty
hospitals, provides no limits on the self-referral practices of original physician
investors, and creates a situation in which an incoming physician could
146. See id. § 1395nn.
147. See id.
148. The Breaux Amendment's grandfather clause allows physician self-referral if the specialty
hospital meets the following requirements: (1) is in existence or development prior to June 12, 2003,
(2) does not increase the number of beds or physician investors, and (3) meets other requirements
specified. Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, H.R. 1, 108th Cong. §
453(a)(1)(B)(7)(B) (2003). Under the Hospital Investment Act, the self-referral prohibition does not
apply to ownership and investment interests purchased before July 12, 2001. Hospital Investment
Act of 2003, H.R. 1539, 108th Cong. § 2(b) (2003).
149. MedCath Inc., a national chain of cardiac specialty hospitals, has eleven facilities
nationwide, all of which would be exempt under the Breaux Amendment: Arkansas Heart Hospital
(1997), Tucson Heart Hospital (1997), Arizona Heart Hospital (1998), Heart Hospital of Austin
(1999), Dayton Heart Hospital (1999), Bakersfield Heart Hospital (1999), Heart Hospital of New
Mexico (1999), Heart Hospital of South Dakota (Mar. 2001), Harlingen Medical Center (Oct. 2002),
Louisiana Heart Hospital (Mar. 2003), Heart Hospital of Milwaukee (Oct. 2003), Heart Hospital of
San Antonio (under development); Heart Hospital of Lafayette (Fall 2003). See MedCath, Inc. 2002
Annual Report 28, available at http://ir.thomsonfn.comInvestorRelations/IRFiles/5531/MedCath
Annual.pdf (last visited June 28, 2004).
150. See Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, H.R. 1, 108th Cong. § 453
(2003).
151. See supra Part IV.B. and accompanying notes.
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essentially purchase an interest and the ability to self-refer from an original
physician investor. Lawmakers should press to eliminate this type of
grandfather clause.
3. Lawmakers Should Provide Specific Limitations on Allowable Investment
Interests for Original and Future Investors
Empirical research demonstrates a consistent increase in utilization of
services when physicians refer patients to facilities in which they have a
financial interest. 152 However, such research has not identified at what
threshold the financial interest becomes problematic. 153 Therefore, any
statutory limitation on the allowable financial interest is essentially a bestguess estimate. Given this absence of data, legislators should consider selfreferral restrictions that prohibit the practice entirely, as do existing Stark laws
and other statutes that limit professional conflicts of interest. 54 Alternatively,
legislators may attempt to draft legislation that limits self-referral to
circumstances in which the extent of the physician's financial interest is
unlikely to influence referral and treatment decisions. While the former
enjoys the advantage of simplicity in drafting and implementation, the latter
preserves some freedom of investment.
Both the Breaux Amendment and the Hospital Investment Act allow for
continued self-referral by original physician investors, but neither federal
proposal limits the extent to which an individual physician, or a physicians'
group, can invest in a particular entity. 155 Under both proposals, an individual
physician or physicians' group may have a substantial interest in a specialized
facility and yet still be permitted to self-refer.
At least one state has enacted legislation that attempts to address this
situation. 156 The Florida self-referral statute places restrictions on the
157
allowable investment interest beyond which self-referral is not permitted.
The statute provides that if the health care provider's interest is in an entity
other than a publicly held corporation, the provider may not self-refer unless,
in addition to other requirements, physicians who refer patients hold no more

152. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
153. See supra Part III.
154. See supra Part I.
155. The Hospital Investment Act restricts self-referral only if the physician's investment
interest was obtained on terms available to the general public. See Hospital Investment Act of 2003,
H.R. 1539, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (2003). The Breaux Amendment allows self-referral unless the
facility was not in existence or under development as of November 2003. See supra note 141 and
accompanying text.
156. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.053(5)(a)-(b) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004).
157. Id.
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than fifty percent of the total investment interests. 158 However, under this
statute, the allowable interest is determined in reference to the extent of
investment interest held by referring physicians in the entire entity, rather than
a determination based upon the individual physician's percentage of
ownership interest. 159 Under this scheme, a single physician could own fifty
percent of the investment interests.
If lawmakers decide to allow self-referral under specified circumstances,
self-referral statutes should contain provisions similar to the Florida statute
that limit the extent of allowable investment interests held by referring
physicians in the entire entity. This would effectively limit the amount of
interest a single physicians' group could obtain in a single entity. In addition,
however, lawmakers should limit the amount of interest any individual
physician can obtain in a single entity and still be permitted to self-refer to
that facility. As stated earlier, in the absence of data, setting such limitations
is difficult. Lawmakers should consider that the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission considers an investment interest that exceeds ten percent
significant and requires investors in public companies to submit additional
filings with the agency when their interest exceeds this amount. 60 This could
be an effective trigger for individual physician investors in specialty hospitals
as well.
C. Lawmakers Should Enact or Expand State Legislation

Existing and proposed federal laws place restrictions only on the referral
of Medicare and Medicaid patients, permitting self-referral of patients with
private health insurance.1 61 Because changes in referral behavior affect all
patients, irrespective of the reimbursement source, the benefit of self-referral
prohibitions should not be limited to those seeking services under Medicare or
Medicaid. State legislation is necessary to enact self-referral restrictions that

158. Id. The interest must also meet the following additional requirements: (1) "the terms
under which an investment interest is offered to [a referring investor] are no different from the terms
offered to [nonreferring investors]," (2) "the terms under which an investment interest is offered to [a
referring investor] are not related to the previous or expected volume of referrals from that investor,"
and (3) "there is no requirement that an investor make referrals or be in a position to make referrals
to the entity as a condition for becoming or remaining an investor." See id If the interest is in a
publicly held corporation, the Florida statute provides that a health care provider may not self-refer
unless the corporation's shares are traded on a national exchange and the "total assets at the end of
the corporation's most recent fiscal quarter exceeded $50 million." Id. Alternatively, shares may be
traded on the over-the-counter market. Id. The statute does not limit the amount of investment
interest that can be held by referring investors in a publicly held corporation. Id.
159. Id.

160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (2000).
161. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
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apply to all patient referrals, regardless of the payor.
VII. CONCLUSION

Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated that when physicians refer
patients to health care providers in which they have a financial interest, there
are significant changes in treatment and referral behavior. The result is
overutilization of medical services, a consequence that increases the risk of
harm for patients and drives up already staggering health care costs. Selfreferral by physician investors in specialty hospitals may also promote patient
credentialing and favorable patient selection, creating negative consequences
for local hospitals that provide a broad range of services, including charity
and emergency care.
In 1989, the U.S. Congress enacted the Stark laws to limit physician selfreferral. However, Stark's whole hospital exemption, which was intended to
exempt investment interests in large general hospitals, also exempts physician
investment in specialty hospitals, facilities that tend to be much smaller in size
and scope. In addition, most existing state self-referral laws do not prohibit
self-referral by physician investors in specialty hospitals.
Policymakers have recognized the need to address this troublesome
conflict of interest, and the U.S. Congress considered proposals to amend the
whole hospital exemption in 2003. However, in lieu of enacting self-referral
restrictions, an eighteen-month moratorium on self-referral by physician
investors of newly developed specialty hospitals was imposed.
While the moratorium and proposed federal restrictions may adequately
protect the federal government's interests, legislators should carefully
examine whether existing state provisions or the proposed federal legislation
will adequately limit physician self-referral and patient credentialing in local
markets. In light of the limitations identified in this Comment, legislators
should consider provisions or amendments that address these issues and
effectively limit the conflict of interest that stems from self-referral by
physician investors in specialty hospitals.
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